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Abstract: Inclusive businesses (IBs), embodying partnerships between commercial agribusinesses and
smallholder farmers/low-income communities, are considered to contribute towards rural development
and agricultural sector transformation. Structured as complex organizational set-ups consisting of,
and overcoming the limitations of, standard inclusive instruments (collective organization, mentorship,
supply contract, lease/management contract and equity), they allow for the inclusion of smallholders
and low-income communities into commercial agricultural value chains. IBs are a way for governments
to engage private agribusinesses in agricultural and rural policies. However, will the commercial
sector, through IB partnerships, contribute towards the government’s transformation and developmental
objectives? Based on case studies in South Africa—a country engaged in land and agrarian reforms—the
effects of IBs at the project level appear positive, illustrated by an increase in production and growth in
agricultural assets. However, individual beneficiaries experience only a marginal change in income and
livelihoods. Whereas land reform, project development and market integration are generally achieved,
the transformation and beneficiary development objectives are compromised. Although commercial
agribusinesses contribute to investment needs in the sector and smallholder exposure to commercial
markets, IB partnerships allow commercial entities control over the smallholders’ assets. Ownership and
secure rights, especially of land, and support of external parties to capacitate beneficiaries and adjust
power asymmetries, are essential starting points. Without these aspects, IBs will not lead to effective
transformation and development.
Keywords: inclusive business; land reform; rural development; agriculture; South Africa
1. Introduction
Inclusive businesses (IBs) are commercially viable business partnerships between large-scale
farms, agribusinesses or large corporations (the commercial partner) on the one hand, and smallholder
farmers and low-income communities (the beneficiaries) on the other [1]. These partnerships, which can
take various forms as will be described in this paper, are considered to play an increasingly vital role in
developing countries, not only in terms of creating local jobs, improving livelihoods and food security,
supporting gender diversity, and enhancing economic options, but also in respect to transferring skills,
technologies, quality management and sound business standards along value chains, particularly
in favor of the smaller farm entities and low-income communities [2]. IBs are increasingly complex
institutional set-ups, combining numerous levels of organization, as well as different instruments,
aimed at including smallholder farmers and other previously disadvantaged groups in commercial
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agricultural value chains, and subsequently, at transferring a share of the IBs’ value addition to these
beneficiaries [1]. The combination of instruments, embedded in IB structures, partly relates to the
well-documented shortcomings of individual instruments. These interlinked instruments further
aim to overcome uncertainty and indicate a power imbalance between the commercial partner and
the beneficiaries.
In addition, in the particular case of South Africa, IBs are presently being promoted as “win–win”
strategies for smallholders and agribusinesses, and as a solution for revitalizing stagnating land
reform and agricultural development, particularly among smallholders and emergent farmers [3–6].
Firstly, the country is characterized by concentrated land ownership and a highly dualistic agricultural
sector. The government aims to address this skewed land ownership through its land reform policy
framework. This framework is built on three pillars: land restitution to return land to communities that
were forcefully removed during the apartheid era; land redistribution to increase ownership of land
for black farmers; and land tenure reform aimed at enhancing tenure security under different legal
and traditional arrangements [7]. Secondly, the government is seeking to bring about a more equal
agricultural sector with increased participation by the formerly excluded black population through a
policy framework aimed at sector transformation and empowerment. To achieve these dual reforms,
the government actively supports certain forms of partnerships such as strategic partnerships between
the land claimant community and a commercial operator for redistributed or restituted farms, grants to
establish farm-worker equity share schemes to alter land ownership, and prescribed mentorships
with commercial partners as a condition for emerging farmers to gain access to government land
and grant funding [1,8–10]. It envisages these IB partnerships as tools to provide smallholders with,
among other things, technical assistance and market access, but also financial contributions, to prevent
the failure of the many land reform projects in South Africa [11,12]. These partnerships fit the narrative
of an efficient, market-led model of land reform that supports the large-scale commercial farming
model [12,13].
The question that arises in this context of commercial contribution to developmental goals set by
government is how these IBs contribute to beneficiary empowerment, transforming land distribution
and generating agrarian reform. This question is imperative considering that the commercial partner
potentially prioritizes its profit drive over the government’s aim of transformation [14], and as such,
jeopardizes the essence of IBs.
This paper aims to provide an answer to this question based on strong and extensive empirical
evidence, as it presents insights from primary research on 14 IB cases across South Africa. Each of
these case studies, active in various agricultural sub-sectors and provinces, was selected for its
unique organizational structure and its relatively stable and sustainable state. The case studies’ unique
structures reflect the diversity of IBs and the combination of instruments, and allows for the assessment
of diverging results for IBs as a project and the impact of these combinations of instruments with
regard to the inclusion of smallholder farmers and poor communities in particular. The choice of stable
and sustainable IB cases was retained to allow for conclusions to be drawn from concrete evidence
based on relative success stories or good practices.
Following this contextualization and problem-statement introduction, the next section provides a
brief description of the theoretical framework that underlies the formation of complex IB structures and
presents the case studies and instruments which were empirically assessed for this project. Section 3
links the theoretical and policy frameworks to provide an answer to the first question on how the policy
framework influences the establishment of IBs. Sections 4 and 5 present insights into the multi-level
impact of the performance of IBs and their contributions to development. Section 4 analyzes the IBs
from a project level, whereas Section 5 analyzes the performance relating to individual beneficiaries
in particular. While referring back to the theoretical framework, Section 6 analyzes the structural
limitations of IBs as tool for beneficiary empowerment and South Africa’s broader development and
transformation objectives. This leads to Section 7 which outlines recommendations to make IBs more
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equitable and sustainable, enhancing their contribution as tools for public development. In conclusion,
Section 8 places IBs within the wider debate on land reform and agricultural transformation.
2. From Theoretical Framework to Concrete Set-Up—IBs as Complex Organizational Structures
This section briefly addresses the questions as to why partnerships between agribusinesses and
smallholders/low-income communities are established, why these partnerships implement unique
organizational structures using standard instruments, and how these instruments are combined.
The answers lie in three sequential steps (Figure 1). Firstly, resource dependence theory (RDT) argues
that partners are driven to minimize uncertainty related to dependency on external parties for their
core activities [15]. Rather than aiming for efficiency, partners try to obtain power over the resources of
another stakeholder [16]. This thinking is particularly relevant to IBs which are inherently uncertain
due to the unfamiliarity between the agribusiness and the low-income community [17] and the
power imbalance favoring the commercial partner [18]. RDT thus identifies the likely partners and
the core instrument implemented by the more powerful partner to overcome uncertainty related
to resources owned by the partner. Secondly, the more powerful commercial partner then aims
to transact as efficiently as possible with the low-income community and to protect its IB-specific
investments, core arguments of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) [19]. The greater financial means
of the commercial partner are likely to drive safeguards in the contractual agreement that favor this
stakeholder, potentially at the expense of the smallholders/low-income community in that IB. Once
the partnership is operational, the principal (the commercial agribusiness in an IB) wants to ensure that
the agents (smallholders or low-income community) act in accordance with the contract entered into as
reasoned by Agency Theory (AT) [20]. Principals are faced with moral hazard (shirking by the agent)
and adverse selection risks. Reducing these risks requires observation costs. The principal’s aim is to
balance these risks and costs, with goal alignment a critical tool to obtain this balance [20] Instruments
are thus implemented in the overall IB structure to minimize shirking risks and observation costs,
once again with the likelihood of benefiting the commercial partner more than the beneficiaries.
The central elements binding these theories are power imbalance and uncertainty reduction, as
expressed through different risk profiles between the partners [21]. See Chamberlain and Anseeuw [22]
for a detailed argumentation and application of this theoretical framework.
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Figure 1. Holistic framework for the explanation of complex inclusive business set-ups.
To gain insight into the contribution of IBs to the development and transformation goals of
the South African government, 14 case studies have been selected. Interviews with the commercial
partner, beneficiary representatives and randomly selected individual beneficiaries, as well as external
stakeholders such as financiers or government officials, provided insights into the organizational
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structure, the drivers behind IB participation, and the impacts of these IBs. The case studies, which have
all achieved a certain level of sustainability, vary greatly in terms of scale, crop, location, and type of
beneficiary (Table 1). To illustrate, Mphiwe Siyalima only has one beneficiary who is fully dependent
on the IB for his livelihood, whereas cases such as Mondi, New Dawn and Richmond have over 1000
beneficiaries, who are not actively engaged in the IB and rely on alternative income streams such
as social grants and non-IB related employment. Other beneficiaries, such as in the THS and SST
cases, are passive landowners who are unable to independently cultivate their land and consider IB
participation as a way to supplement their non-IB related income with land rental.
Each of the standard instruments identified can be implemented for the production of a range of
crops, and are thus not crop or sector specific. Nor are the IBs crop and sector specific, although certain
combinations of instruments tend to fit certain contexts better. For example, Tongaat Hulett Sugar
(THS) and other sugar producers source sugar cane directly from small farmers through a simple
supply contract and through two models included in this study, whereas several models have been
implemented in the forestry sector, varying from large-scale plantations (the Mondi case in this study)
to supply contracts from smallholder farmers [23]. IBs only seem less suitable for highly mechanized
grain production where economies of scale dominate [24].
Following from the theoretical framework, Figure 2 summarizes the combinations of instruments
as observed in our 14 case studies. Each of the IBs is centered on the instrument best suited to gain
access to a specific resource (in italic in Table 1), thus overcoming an initial dependency. Additional
instruments are then added to the IB structure to reduce transaction costs, to safeguard IB-specific
investments, and to ensure that the smallholders/low-income communities adhere to the contract that
they agreed upon. These motivations create unique organizational structures, interlinking up to five
different instruments, for the integration of IB beneficiaries into commercial value chains.
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Table 1. Case Study Description.
Case Study Characteristics Description
Mphiwe Siyalima Beneficiaries: 1Area: 672 ha
Individual farmer on leased government land with multiple partnerships driven by mentor, allowing for diversification of
crops and marketing channels. Centered on supply contract for fresh vegetables.
WUFA Beneficiaries: 74Area: ±200 ha
Collective organization of individual farmers with collectively owned anchor farm. Non-binding supply contract for citrus
with off-taker, in exchange for equity in processor. Smallholders produce on contract through the collective, and other crops,
as individuals, for other channels.
TechnoServe-Nwanedi Beneficiaries: 57Area: ±200 ha
Individual farmers supported by mentor who arranges supply contract for butternut and external financing by separate
stakeholders. Technical support only for production of other vegetables.
TechnoServe-Massmart Beneficiaries: 87Area: ±185 ha
Loose collective of smallholders mentored by NGO in production of vegetables on supply contract. Off-taker is financial
sponsor. Smallholder collective, NGO, and off-taker share equity in new pack house.
Blue Mountain Berries Beneficiaries: 70Area: 257 ha
Farm workers of newly-established blueberry farm organized in collective with equity in farm, shared with commercial
farmer and DFI who warehouses loan financing of employees. Part funded by government grant. Farmer with equity
working on management contract.
Katmakoep Boerdery Beneficiaries: 5Area: 103 ha
Selected employees of farm management company are individual shareholders of investment company (collective) with
equity in new raisin farm shared with employer. Employee ownership funded by commercial off-taker, in exchange for
supply contract.
Bosman Vineyards Beneficiaries: 260Area: 430 ha
Workers of long-established wine and vine farm, organized in collective, initially obtained full ownership in two of seven
farms. In the second phase, all farms were brought under one company with shared equity between the commercial farm
owner and the workers.
THS—Vuselela Beneficiaries: 2555Area: 3700 ha
Small landholders lease land to cooperative with supply contract with sugar off-taker. Cooperative owns cane roots,
funded by government grant. Operational management by off-taker.
THS—Simamisa Beneficiaries: 6600Area: ±6700 ha
Small landholders give power of attorney to a cooperative that leases their land to sugar producer who owns cane roots.
Operational management by external management company.
Mondi Paper Beneficiaries: 1660Area: 4000 ha
Existing forestry plantation sold by paper producer to land claimant collective and leased back with trees still owned by
paper producer. Claimant community business contracted for plantation work, mentored by commercial paper producer.
New Dawn Beneficiaries: 1615Area: 1050 ha
Tropical fruit farming on land leased from land claimant community by joint venture with shared equity of commercial
operator and land claimant collective. Operational control through management contract and marketing activities owned by
commercial equity partner.
Richmond Beneficiaries: 1615Area: 2434 ha
Land claimant collective leases land to commercial operator for tropical fruit production. Lease based on fixed amount and
profit share.
Seven Stars Trust (SST) Beneficiaries: 36Area: 731 ha
Individual landowners organized in two-tier cooperative structure contribute land to sharemilk agreement governed by
Trust. Cattle and moveable assets contributed by commercial partner, fixed assets funded from government grant.
Management contract with commercial partner. Profits shared between landowners and commercial partner, instead of lease
rental. Trust has equity in downstream dairy processor.
Gxulu Berries Beneficiaries: 217Area: 9 ha
Community-owned blueberry farm with minority equity for DFI funder. Land leased from community cooperative.
Informal supply contract with commercial farm for produce off-take and mentorship.
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Firstly, a lease agreement provides a commercial agribusiness with access to land owned by
smallholders/low-income communities at minimum risk. In this study, this instrument is always
combined with a collective organization that either holds the land title, as dictated by government to
land restitution communities (Mondi, New Dawn and Richmond), or is a gathering of individuals,
each with a small area of land (THS cases). The collective organization allows the commercial lessee
to minimize transaction costs. Shared equity with the landowners in the operating farm company
provides the commercial partner access to favorable financing earmarked to assist poor landowners to
engage in activities on their land (New Dawn), underlining the resource dependency argument. It also
aligns the goals of both equity partners, reducing the risk of shirking as argued by AT. Shared equity
requires a supply contract and a management agreement by the commercial partner to gain control over
the produce and operation respectively, effectively allowing the commercial partner to appropriate the
output of its efforts as operator [25]. A supply contract is also implemented where the beneficiaries own
both the land and the productive assets such as sugarcane roots (THS-Vuselela) or trees. A lease plus
mentorship prepares the landowners for independent farm operations whilst allowing the off-taker
to closely monitor the activities of the landowners (Mondi). Lastly, a commercial lessor enters into a
management contract with a third party to reduce transaction costs related to the interaction with the
smallholders (THS-Simamisa).
Secondly, a supply contract rather allows the commercial partner to gain access to produce instead
of land, involving smallholders actively working their land. These smallholder farmers are unfamiliar
with the business of supplying the commercial value chain and thus require additional support in
the form of a mentorship (TNS-MM). This instrument not only improves the skills of the smallholder,
but also allows the off-taker to observe the smallholder’s behavior and warrant the smallholder’s
adherence to the contractual obligations as argued by AT. Working with a collective of smallholders
reduces the off-taker’s transaction costs. In several cases (TNS-MM, WUFA), the smallholders have
been provided equity in downstream facilities, increasing their interests in supplying this particular
channel, and, in theory, reducing extra-contractual sales [22].
The third instrument—equity—is applied to establish joint ventures that can gain access to
favorable financing earmarked to bring about transformation and stimulate development through
increased ownership by poor communities. The availability of favorable financing creates external
dependency by the commercial partner on these communities and is the main driver for the choice of this
instrument. In this study, equity always involves a collective organization of beneficiaries to efficiently
manage the shareholding of these beneficiaries (Blue Mountain Berries, Bosman Vineyards). A supply
contract subsequently transfers ownership of the produce fully to the off-taker, whereas a management
contract transfers control over the IB operation to the commercial partner (Katmakoep Boerdery).
Both instruments diminish the IB-related risks for the commercial partner, but also reduce the inclusion
of the beneficiaries, undermining the development goal that underlines the funding.
Fourthly, a collective organization potentially allows smallholders to overcome scale issues and
increase their appeal as a partner for a commercial agribusiness argued by RDT. This collective can
consist of active farmers entering into a supply contract (WUFA), or passive landowners leasing out their
land (SST). In the first scenario, mentorship and equity improve the business case for the smallholders
and align goals between the farmers and the firm. In the second scenario, shared asset contribution
between the partners motivates the commercial partner to negotiate an additional management contract
to gain control over the farming activities.
Lastly, a smallholder can search for a mentor to enable him/her to gain access to the commercial
value chain (TNS-Nwanedi). In the particular case of South Africa, the institutional environment
compels farmers signing a land lease with the government to enter into such a mentorship, thus directly
dictating the instrument choice for the lessee (Mphiwe Siyalima). A supply contract anchors the
smallholder’s business, whilst the independent mentor reduces the smallholder’s dependency on
this particular off-taker through the development of the farmer’s skills and the opening up of
diversification opportunities.
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This short elaboration on the interlinkage of instruments illustrates that the power imbalance
allows the commercial partner to indeed dictate the organizational structure of the IB. Control over the IB
structure is further increased by the risk attitude of both partners. Risk averse smallholders without full
information regarding both the highly complex contracts and commercial market operation appear to
accept a lower share of the rewards of the IB in return for a lower risk exposure, whereas the risk-taking
commercial partners are able to appropriate the results of high input of efforts [25–27]. Risk reduction,
specifically in the form of moral hazard by an unfamiliar partner, drive the agri-businesses in particular
to implement interlinked instruments, within the specific policy framework of South Africa [21]. A more
detailed analysis on the interaction between these instruments within the confines of an IB is outside of
the scope of this particular paper.1
3. Land Reform Policies as a Driver of IBs
The IBs analyzed in this study strongly reflect the South African government’s transformation
goals, and land reform policies in particular, which not only promote but also shape the implementation
of IBs and their organizational structure. Two areas of policy impacting on the institutional set-up
have been identified, namely indirect and direct policy. Indirect policy is related to the country’s land
redistribution and restitution policies, which change the ownership structure of land, thus affecting
the access to land and produce. This results in the creation of dependency—either for land or
produce—of commercial businesses on smallholders/low-income communities as new landowners,
indirectly stimulating the establishment of IBs. Land dependency tends to stimulate IBs based on the
lease instrument, especially where the new landowners are inexperienced and have no technical or
financial capacity to develop their farming activities. Vice versa, the new landowners, conditioned
by government to continue the often high-value, commercial activities on their newly acquired land,
are dependent on a commercial operator, driving equity- and mentorship-based IBs.
Agribusiness dependency on smallholders in the South African context is extended through the
AgriBEE policy. Under this scheme, agri-processing companies are stimulated to increase their supply
from smallholders and low-income communities. Agribusinesses affected by this policy can implement
IBs centered on a supply contract with historically disadvantaged farmers. Dependency between
agribusiness and smallholders is further deepened by the availability of favorable government funding
to achieve the policy goals of land reform and agricultural transformation. Thus, the policy framework
creates a stimulating environment that reinforces smallholders and low-income communities [28],
but the stakeholders are flexible in the organizational structure they implement.
In addition, the government supports, and even forces, the implementation of favored instruments,
and thus directly drives the structure of an IB, illustrating that the institutional context limits the
contract choice between partners [21]. As such, the Limpopo provincial government forced land
claimant communities and commercial partners to enter into joint venture structures where both
partners share equity in a newly established operating company (New Dawn) [8]. The government in
the Western Cape Province rather favored farm-worker equity schemes, providing grant funding to
numerous projects under its jurisdiction to transfer land/farm ownership from a commercial farmer to
his/her employees (Blue Mountain Berries, Bosman Vineyards) [29]. Furthermore, under the national
land redistribution framework, emerging farmers gained access to government land rental on condition
of a mentorship by a commercial farmer/agribusiness (Mphiwe Siyalima). Lastly, smallholders across
the country are stimulated by government to organize themselves into cooperatives in order to offer
scale to a commercial partner (SST).
Despite the positive impact of the policy framework on the initiation of IBs, this study also illustrates
the shortcomings of government engagement. Financing for beneficiaries’ equity, be it to land claimant
communities or farm workers, has either been cumbersome or has not materialized at all, putting IBs
1 We refer to a forthcoming publication for a conceptual overview of IBs as multi-instrument set-ups.
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with an equity component under significant financial, and subsequent operational, strain. The drive
for collective organizations is not backed up by the capacitation of these communal bodies, leaving the
beneficiaries in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the commercial partner. Even government-initiated
mentorships have been more beneficial to the mentor than to the mentee [1]. Contract constraints,
although aimed at assisting the IB beneficiaries, can thus result in an opposite effect [21].
Nevertheless, the socio-political context of South Africa has forced agribusinesses to create
partnerships with smallholders and low-income communities. However, these partnerships do not
necessarily align with their profit objective. To reduce their risk in relation to these unfamiliar partnerships,
the commercial partner will aim to safeguard control over the IB according to the theoretical framework.
This has driven many of the complexities observed in the studied IB structures, with most of the additional
instruments implemented to benefit the commercial partner rather than the smallholders/low-income
communities. The risk is thus of corporate control over low-income community-owned resources, rather
than the envisaged development of the beneficiaries IBs aim to assist [26]. This will be further analyzed in
the next two sections elaborating on the results of IBs.
4. Varying Results at IB Project Level
The IBs studied show different outcomes, not only as a business, but also for the beneficiaries
included. The IBs performances on these two levels subsequently lead to varying impact on the overall
government goals of agricultural sector transformation and land reform. The same instruments can
lead to different results, depending on factors such as the combination with other instruments, as
well as the specific conditions in operation. This section analyzes the results of the IB as organization,
whereas the next section focuses on the impact on the individual beneficiaries. The remaining sections
refer back to the wider public debate.
At project level in particular, the assessments of the IB cases studied show positive results, as
envisaged by proponents of IBs [2,30–32]. Overall, the large majority of the case studies showed a
degree of sustainability, and in many cases even growth at project level. This is illustrated by an
increase in land under production, the accumulation of assets and infrastructure, and the accrual of
income at project level. Although the businesses are not necessarily generating profits, most seem to
be able to grow and develop their activities. Positive results were also manifested when considering
external linkages. Although linkages to the local economy were in some cases minimal, with few
spatial spin-offs [33], access to input and output markets for the IBs were attained in most, if not
all, cases. In addition, the projects provided access to technology and technological development,
enabled certifications, and created job opportunities for the local community. As such, IBs—as complex
combinations of inclusive instruments—have been shown at project level to have the capacity to create
conditions for the sustainable inclusion of smallholders and low-income communities in modern
value chains.
However, a few notes of caution are necessary. The IBs analyzed were selected because they had
been in existence for some time and were in a medium to longer state of maintenance (required for
assessment purposes). Even the cases that were struggling at project level, and which were evolving
into new structural set-ups, showed regular and significant income at project level. This purposive
selection bias has to be taken into consideration when drawing conclusions from this work, and when
generalizing the impact of IBs. One should indeed be careful not to overrate the overall impact (positive
and less positive) of these IBs, even at project level. Many of the IBs in South Africa do not reach
the implementation phase, or fail during implementation [34], thus illustrating the many challenges
to be overcome before being able to start operating. In no case can the results based on this study’s
analysis lead to a quantification of the overall impact, when all IBs—success stories and failures—are
considered. The positive impact of the IBs described here should be seen as a positive outcome of
successful cases, or in other words, as potential benefits and rewards when an IB is successful.
The results of this study also indicate that outcomes are diverse, even when the same instrument
is used. This is illustrated, for example, in the case of mentorship related to land reform policies.
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Two emerging farmers gained access to government-owned land on a leasehold, on condition of
a mentorship agreement. Whereas little knowledge transfer occurred for one farmer, the other
farmer seems to have gained from the mentorship agreement [1]. Similarly, farm-worker equity
is implemented in different ways, leading to vastly different outcomes at project level [35]. A decisive
role in the implementation and operation of the IB, especially regarding the level of empowerment,
is required for the (team of) individuals driving the IB company. Whereas a commercial partner might
be vital to the operation of the farm, its profit-generating argument needs to be accompanied by a
drive for inclusion of the smallholders in order to establish mutually beneficial partnerships.
5. Results to Be Nuanced at Smallholder and Beneficiary Level
The outcomes and results on IB level as presented in the previous section also need to be nuanced
at smallholder and beneficiary level. Even when IBs show positive results at project level, the outcomes
for individual beneficiaries might be less optimistic. This is certainly the case when the IBs are assessed
in practice: the effective impact on smallholders is often less positive than the theoretical and potential
impact [1].
One of the most significant challenges is the lack of rewards, whether financial or material, for the
beneficiaries. The benefits for the smallholders and low-income community members at individual
levels are often very low—if they exist at all. This is confirmed by other evaluations. For example,
Lahiff et al. [8] write that “twelve years after the lodgment of their restitution claims, and five years after
the return of the first lands, most households have yet to see any positive impact on their livelihood.
This is a source of great frustration for many, given the expectations that were raised by the restoration
of the land and the establishment of commercial partnerships with private-sector operators, the huge
sums of public money consumed and the extensive participation by community members over many
years in discussions and planning exercises”. Several aspects can be noted here. Firstly, the financial
revenues for individual beneficiaries are often low when the case involves a large collective of often
passive smallholders/beneficiaries among which IB funds need to be divided. The limited revenues
from the IB have often been intermittent and generally well below the expected rates [8]. Secondly, few
of the IBs studied have made a profit since implementation and thus few have disbursed dividends
to the beneficiaries, even though many members expected these to be the main form of revenue
received from the IB where equity is concerned [36]. Rental incomes for individual landowners and
landowning collectives have been equally disappointing. In many cases, the IBs are new or neglected
farms where any revenues realized need to be used for reinvestments, farm expansion and debt
repayments. In general, these IBs, which have become complex business set-ups, will need time to
grow and stabilize. Important to note is the possible goal incongruence between the commercial
partners, whose aim is to establish a viable company in the long term, and the beneficiaries and
communities who often expect financial returns for the individual beneficiaries in the short term [37].
Thirdly, in many cases confusion exists around what has happened to the limited revenues received,
especially where larger community organizations are involved. The non-transparent use of received
funds by the organization’s leadership has led to even less effective direct payment, in cash or kind,
to the individual community members. As Lahiff et al. [8] observed, community leaders were generally
not in favor of paying out cash benefits to members (and under the prevailing financial conditions this
would have been very difficult), and were actively involved in dampening down popular expectations.
They did, however, acknowledge that people could not wait indefinitely to see some benefits from their
“successful” restitution claim. This lack of transparency undermines the position of the (sometimes
democratically elected) community representatives who are seen to be abusing their position of
power for self-enrichment, and preventing any residual claims from flowing through to the general
members [38]. Even active smallholder beneficiaries who (partly) depend on the IB activities for their
livelihoods, such as the smallholders operating under a mentorship, struggle with the high levels
of debt related to their commercial activities, negatively impacting on their income. Social benefits,
such as jobs and skills transfer for the IB beneficiaries have been disappointing. Lastly, positive
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outcomes from the IB at project level, such as market access and certification, often remain at the level
of the IB as a whole and do not trickle through to the individual community members.
An IB cannot be considered inclusive without an equitable partnership between the commercial
partner and the smallholder farmers/low-income community. This implies that the beneficiaries should
actively participate in the decision-making processes regarding objectives, planning, operating methods
and the like [39]. As such, the beneficiaries’ voice is central to an IB. Historically, smallholders’ and farm
workers’ voice and influence on decision making has been limited [40]. Several instruments provide
potential to increase the active participation of the smallholders in the IB. Firstly, equity/ownership is
generally combined with representation on the decision-making bodies of the IB [36]. Secondly, collective
organization creates a platform for the individual members to bundle their voice [41,42]. However, this
study illustrates that IBs are not able (in the short term) to overcome the unequal balance of power
between corporate partner and beneficiaries. Lack of knowledge and (financial and material) resources
often leave the smallholder/low-income community in a dependent position. The skills development
of the beneficiaries is generally not part of the commercial partner’s responsibilities. Whereas the
commercial partner might transfer knowledge regarding the operational activities, it does not extend to
the management of a collective of beneficiaries, or the long-term management of a commercially operated
agricultural business. Even mentorships, where in essence the mentee is an independent actor, still
show a high degree of dependence on the part of the smallholder farmer. This paints a bleak picture
for the long-term capability of the beneficiaries to independently operate their assets. As remarked by
Hendrickson et al. regarding the particular situation in South Africa, “It can take a very long time for
oppressed groups to strengthen their voice to the dominant members of society” [43].
The dominant position of the commercial partner in the IB enables it to transfer to the smallholders
a non-corresponding share of the risks related to the farming operation, despite the general risk-averse
character of the smallholders. Instruments such as mentorship and supply contracts leave the
smallholders exposed to a high degree of operational risk in particular, with crop failure and price
changes having a direct impact on their income [44]. The lease agreements in this study are often based
on a small profit-/produce-sharing basis, once again transferring to the beneficiaries a portion of the
risks from the commercial partner, who has full say over the activities on the smallholders’ land, as well
as ownership over the produce. On the other hand, collective organization—either by the beneficiaries
or through shared equity in an IB—can spread the risk for the individuals [45]. Nevertheless, it is
observed that collective organization adds high levels of complexity to the business and exposes the IB
to additional challenges related to the internal management of the collective [36]. However, whereas
the beneficiaries seem to carry a high degree of operational risk, financial risks are usually borne by the
commercial partner or a third-party financier. Individual beneficiaries are rarely exposed financially on
a personal title. Grant funding plays a significant role in managing the risks for the commercial partner
when entering into what are considered high-risk projects, due to, for example, the inexperience of the
smallholders or the high level of financial investment required for the development of the farming
operation. This confirms that commercial partners often engage in IBs if they can manage their risks to
ensure a positive return on their investment, whereas the smallholders seem to suffer from a lack of
insight to fully understand their risks.
Ownership and/or secure rights, especially of land, are often crucial to the beneficiaries. Most commercial
partners are driven to engage with smallholders by the need to access this land. As such, ownership and/or
long-term secure rights give the smallholders concrete negotiating power in the partnership, although this
alone is not a panacea, as illustrated in the previous paragraph. Ownership/secure rights take on different
forms. As such, equity in an IB has allowed beneficiaries to grow their asset bases. This is illustrated
by considerable investments by the IB in the development of the land and fixed assets of an IB farm.
However, whereas ownership of land often lies with the smallholders, the produce is generally owned by
the commercial partner. The IBs studied show very limited levels of ownership in downstream activities,
severely limiting the bargaining power regarding the proceeds of their land, and negatively impacting
on the potential benefits. Rather, in many IBs the smallholders become mere rent seekers, leaving the
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control over their assets to the commercial partner. Overall, whereas the IB, certainly at project level,
generally opens up markets and gives the smallholders access to inputs, equipment and the like, the level
of ownership generally reduces.
6. IBs and Their Limitations for Transformation
Analysis of the IB cases, as multi-instrument set-ups, and their outcomes provides insights
into the structural limitations of these IBs as tools for agricultural sector transformation and general
development. According to the theoretical framework presented in Section 2, the starting point of an IB
partnership lies in the drive to limit uncertainty related to external dependency. In the case of the IBs
analyzed in this study, this dependency is predominantly created by the policy environment aimed at
land reform and transformation of the agricultural sector. This forced dependency is the first challenge
to obtaining inclusiveness: commercial agribusinesses are not motivated to enter into partnerships
with smallholders to develop these IB beneficiaries or the communities in which the IB operates, rather
these partnerships become a necessary cog in their profit-focused strategy. However, whereas most
commercial partners are only partly dependent on low-income communities for their activities and
income, the reciprocal dependency, both for beneficiary communities and individuals, is much stronger,
considering the beneficiaries’ lack of knowledge and finances to enter into commercial agricultural
operations. This power and knowledge asymmetry allows for contracts that foremost benefit the
commercial partners, undermining the inclusiveness objective from as early as the design phase.
This is apparent for example in the addition of a management contract that transfers control to the
commercial partner.
The second challenge for IBs to contribute to transformation and development lies in the conflicting
IB-specific investment safeguard goal of the commercial partner as argued by TCE. Since financial
contributions to the IB are skewed towards the better resourced commercial partner, contractual
safeguards foremost benefit this agribusiness or other commercial entities. Hence, the inclusion
of clauses such as the repayment of loans before dividends can be declared. The inclusion of
collective organizations in most of the IBs further underlines the challenge of the resulting governance
structure to achieve government’s development goals: whereas these collectives enable the commercial
partners to decrease the costs related to transacting with multiple beneficiaries, these organizations
generally add complexity and challenges for the member beneficiaries. This has a particularly adverse
effect on the financial impact from the IB for the individual beneficiaries. Combining multiple
instruments within an IB has not been able to overcome the challenge of skewed financial contributions.
Complexity, unbalanced power relationships and corporate control all contribute to continued financial
imbalanced tilted towards the commercial partner.
Thirdly, as the principal in the IB partnership, the commercial partner is able to include mechanisms
that align the beneficiaries’ goals. Equity in downstream facilities and produce-/profit share based
lease contracts are designed to incentivize the smallholders to maximize IB production, although the
price determination lies with the commercial partner as owner of the crops. As such, the internal
profit drive of the commercial partner, through optimal farm operation, often abolishes the distributive
objective of the IB. Furthermore, the implementation of the contract is driven by the commercial partner,
based on the organizational set-up that assigns control over the IB to this stakeholder, and which is
reinforced by the asymmetry in knowledge and financial contribution. The community is often not
able to enforce certain clauses detailed in the contract designed for effective enactment of inclusiveness
aspects, specifically training and empowerment activities. Effective implementation of the IB tends to
lag behind the commercial objectives of the IB as a result.
The financial contribution, experience and networks that the commercial partners bring to an IB
allow for positive developments at project level, as observed in farm development and production
growth. However, the structural differences of objectives and the overarching knowledge gap,
both during design and implementation, makes any true inclusiveness in the short term a serious
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challenge, certainly for the individual beneficiaries involved, regardless of how the IB is structured
and operated.
7. Recommendations—Towards More Sustainable and Equitable Inclusive Businesses
Certain lessons are to be learnt from this research that can be applied by stakeholders active in the
field of IB and land reform to create more equitable and sustainable business set-ups [1]. These lessons
are all related and complementary.
The first step regarding the empowerment of smallholders as beneficiaries is ownership. This can
be achieved through ownership of, and/or secure rights over, land and/or produce, but it can also be
attained through equity in joint ventures. Not only is the correlation between ownership—particularly
land—and development well known [46,47], regarding IBs it also relates to the state of being an owner,
i.e., engagement, willingness to contribute, contribution to own development and to self-determination,
contribution to decision making, and balancing of power structures [48]. Although ownership and/or
long-term secure rights are not a cure-all (as others might still control the asset), it certainly serves as a
stepping stone to be built upon.
Secondly, there is a need for effective capacitation of the smallholders/low-income communities.
Ownership contributes to this, but the need to capacitate smallholders and beneficiaries will also be
achieved through knowledge development. This should not only cover operational and technical
skills; equally important are managerial and financial skills, and overall business knowledge. As such,
the beneficiaries should acquire an understanding of commercial farming activities and of the internal
management of a collective organization. It is important to implement a program that ensures
knowledge distribution between the beneficiaries to prevent dependency on a limited number of
leaders who become difficult to replace. Strongly related to this point is the capacity required to build a
truly equal relationship in which the smallholders participate as valued and informed negotiators and
decision makers. This is particularly the case in a situation where historically an unequal relationship
existed, e.g., that of laborer and employer. Thus, whereas smallholders can be integrated into the
commercial agricultural supply chain within a short timeframe, it will take much longer to empower
them to become equal partners, or for the beneficiaries to engage independently in the commercial
value chain.
Thirdly, IBs as organization require support. This study showed that, contrary to expectations,
IBs are not a substitute for the support and investment required to achieve agricultural transformation
or rural development, whether from the State or a third party. Indeed, private financial resources
are needed, as many IBs are either new farming businesses, or are set up to reinvigorate neglected
farmland, both of which require significant funds to develop. Large agribusinesses are often in a better
position to engage in these potentially volatile partnerships. Operational and even developmental
costs are thus likely to be borne by the more financially endowed agribusinesses to enable sustained
operation. At the same time, however, this financial asymmetry can possibly aggravate the power
disparity between the partners, as discussed in the previous paragraph. Besides limiting the risks
for agribusinesses to engage in community partnerships, grant funding or subsidized loans can
play a fundamental role in overcoming the financial burden of such projects, as well as the financial
inequality in the partnership, and with it, an overall imbalance of power within the IB. But support
also involves mediation, the safeguarding of smallholders’ assets, the balancing of power relations, the
monitoring of compliance with contractual agreements, and the exploring of new legal aspects and
dispute resolutions, as well as more flexible options for land use.
Fourthly, related to the previous point, the involvement of a third impartial party can help
overcome power and knowledge asymmetry between the smallholders and the commercial partner.
Often, smallholders/low-income communities can benefit from professional assistance, during both
contract negotiations and the implementation phase when the contractual obligations of both parties
need to be monitored. External assistance in the form of funding can also play a role in addressing
the financial power imbalances, which in part cause the perceived lack of decision-making powers
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of the beneficiaries. A third aspect where outside involvement can benefit IBs as organization, and
their beneficiaries in specific, is the mentoring of the collective when beneficiaries are organized in a
collective organization. Whereas the commercial agribusiness partner generally provides knowledge
related to the operational and management aspects of a commercial farming business, the responsibility
for the internal management of the collective smallholder organization is often unclear and beyond
the scope of the commercial partner. This leaves the smallholder collective impaired when it comes to
the efficient running of the organization, which in turn impacts negatively on the role the collective
plays in the IB.
Fifthly, no sustainable partnership can develop without a high degree of transparency, both between
the partners and internally (in the case of a collective organization of beneficiaries). As Vollman [49]
emphasizes, transparency relates to decision making, pricing structures, financial performance and
allocation of funds, and must be accompanied by clear accountability, practiced from the first negotiations.
Transparency also contributes to evaluation and impact measurement. Due to a lack of transparency,
many smallholders are unable to understand how the IB operates, and specifically why their level of
reward is so low. This in turn impacts negatively on their support of the IB. For transparent communication
to be effective, the beneficiaries must have a basic understanding of business management, which will
have to form part of the overall knowledge development program. Transparency and accountability must
be accompanied by realistic expectation management for smallholders in order for them to understand
that benefits, both financial and social, will take time to materialize.
Lastly, in order to implement a partnership with smallholders, time and realism are indeed required
to achieve results. In many cases, the IBs overall—and the agricultural activities in particular—have
to be developed, or redeveloped, when reviving previously productive areas. However, this is not
the only reason. The capacitation of smallholders, the effective transfer of knowledge and know-how,
and the building of equal relationships in which the smallholders participate as valued and informed
negotiators and decision makers within a broader set-up of establishing a viable large-scale agricultural
enterprise takes time. This can lead to frustration, especially when expectations diverge. Indeed,
alongside the major commercial difficulties being experienced by the IBs, the most obvious weakness is
the lack of material benefits reaching the smallholders and the great majority of community members.
This questions both the effectiveness of the use of public funds, and the expectation management of
the beneficiaries of both their renewed land ownership and the community-private partnership [8].
For such partnerships to be sustainable, it is critical that smallholders and communities benefit from
the venture, be it financially (often difficult to implement) or through the implementation of diverse
land use systems (some to be used by members independently from the IB), or other benefits such as
housing and employment [11]. This is certainly a complex challenge when IBs engage with large groups
of smallholders, beneficiaries and communities.
8. Conclusions: IB as a New Paradigm for Development and Structural Transformation?
IBs are considered to contribute to the public objectives of development and transformation.
Partnerships between corporate agribusiness and smallholder farmers and low-income communities
are, among other things, an avenue to provide access to the commercial value chain, to develop
skills and to improve the livelihoods of IB beneficiaries. However, the results presented in this paper
illustrate that IBs are not a panacea for development and transformation.
Land reform processes and transformation focused policies play a vital role in the establishment
of IBs. The change in land ownership brought about by a diversity of land reform policies triggers
a situation where commercial agribusinesses become dependent on the new landowners for access
to land and produce. These new landowners often lack knowledge, financing and market access,
leading to a reciprocal dependency. Partnerships between commercial agribusinesses and landowning
communities can overcome these dependencies. As such, government supports IBs in general, and even
prescribes specific partnership structures as a condition of land reform beneficiation. However, the
power asymmetry that is tilted in favor of the commercial partner allows the agribusiness to adjust
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the organizational structure of the IB to suit its primary objective, namely the generation of profit.
Whereas this might enhance the performance of the IB as a business organization, the developmental
aspect of the IB is reduced in importance, if not completely ignored. Thus, whereas land reform
is generally achieved, the underlying transformation and beneficiary development objectives are
severely compromised.
Although it is shown that IBs can lead to positive results, particularly at project level (see also [24]
for other examples), in practice the outcome for beneficiaries has to be nuanced. This is even the case
for the projects examined in this study, which purposively focused on relatively stable and sustainable
IBs, and avoided those that were the worst off and those that had failed completely. IBs represent only
a relatively small number of projects in the broader context of smallholder farming and land reform in
South Africa. The National Department of Agriculture estimates that 40,000 commercial farm units
existed in 2007, together with several thousand emerging farmers and 1.2 million small-scale farms in
the former homelands [50]. The extent of the participation of smallholder farmers in IBs thus appears
insignificant. In addition, the replicability of many of the complex IBs is limited, leaving behind the
hope for a broad-based snowball effect [51]. The number of IBs remains low, the IBs that are successful
and sustainable are few, and the IBs have a mixed impact, so it therefore seems appropriate to say
that the IB model or paradigm will only have a marginal impact on the broad transformation of the
agricultural sector in South Africa. We are merely in the presence of a (relatively small) number of
“islands of effectiveness” [52], which do not seem to have the capacity, nor the muscle, to profoundly
restructure the sector.
The low potential for structural transformation in the specific context of South Africa should
not, however, lead to a repudiation of the IB model and paradigm. IBs contribute to agricultural
investment needs, particularly in the case where the State has little capacity and where investment is
needed from the private sector [53,54]. It is thus important to learn from the implemented cases and to
take note of the recommendations in order to improve these models. The study shows, however, that
other development models will be needed if structural transformation and broad-based inclusion of
smallholder farmers are sought in South Africa [55] or elsewhere on the continent and beyond [56].
These insights also apply to global debates on agricultural and rural transformation, and in
particular to the global phenomenon of large-scale land investments and acquisitions, where a
similar power asymmetry between investor and local community plays out [57]. There is a growing
call to make these investments more inclusive for the local communities, for example through
the implementation of out-grower schemes, representing one of the inclusive instruments [58,59].
The results of these kinds of initiatives have remained equally mixed and largely disappointing [60,61],
strengthening the dual observation of the limited effectiveness of such inclusive models and the need
for other—often complementary—development paradigms to initiate large-scale agricultural and rural
transformation. The question of development approaches focusing more on smallholder farmers and
on their endogenous growth, instead of on the linkages between small and big, remains highly relevant.
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